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Parallel State and Federal Court Class Actions
INTRODUCTION
It is generally accepted that one of the fundamental purposes of
the class action device is to provide small claimants with a method
of obtaining redress for claims that would not warrant individual
litigation.1 These claimants are often unknown to one another and
may be geographically dispersed. It is not uncommon, therefore,
for parallel2 class actions to be brought in more than one forum by
different attorneys representing different individual plaintiffs.'
This presents the court in the later filed action with the difficult
question of whether to certify the case as a class action. Federal
courts, when confronted with a prior pending state court suit al-
ready certified as a class action, have generally denied class certifi-
cation to the federal suit.4
The problem of parallel state and federal class actions most
often arises in the context of class actions sought to be maintained
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) di-
1. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968); Escott v. Barchris
Constr. Corp., 340 F.2d 731, 733 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1966). See J. M.
Woodhull, Inc. v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 62 F.R.D. 58, 61 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Min-
nesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559, 572 (D. Minn. 1968); Dolgow v. Ander-
son, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D.
69, 104.
2. "A suit is 'parallel' when substantially the same parties are contemporaneously litigat-
ing substantially the same issues in another forum, thus making it likely that the judgment
in one suit will have a res judicata effect in the other suit." Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American
Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1229 n.1 (7th Cir. 1979).
3. See Comment, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals in Deference to Parallel State
Court Proceedings: The Impact of Colorado River, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 641, 644 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Comment, Colorado River]; Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1604-1618 (1976).
4. See Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975);
Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1975); Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co., 26
F.R.Serv.2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). But see Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41
F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 427 F. Supp. 1211
(N.D. Ill. 1977), on reconsideration, 455 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
5. Class actions are governed by FED. R. Civ. P. 23. In order to be maintained as a class
action, the suit must meet all four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and fall within one of the
subdivisions of Rule 23(b). The class determination is to be made "[als soon as practicable
after the commencement of an action brought as a class action .... FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1). See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 178 (1974); Abrams v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 20 F.R.Serv.2d 170, 177-178 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (certification denied where
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rects the court to consider "the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against mem-
bers of the class. . ". .  It has been suggested that the extent of
litigation already commenced is the most critical of the factors
enumerated in Rule 23(b)(3).' This factor is particularly important
consolidated actions pending for nearly eight years); Taub v. Glickman, 14 F.R.Serv.2d 847
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (certification denied where motion not made until three years after filing of
suit). It is difficult to overstate the importance of the motion for class certification to the
named plaintiffs, absent class members, defendants, and the court. See Miller, An Overview
of Federal Class Actions: Past, Present and Future, 12-13 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Miller, Federal Class Actions]. For an interesting examination of judicial attitudes toward
class actions, see Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality,
and the "Class Action Problem", 92 HAIv. L. REv. 664 (1979).
Class actions seeking primarily money damages are usually certified under Rule 23(b)(3).
Examples include cases alleging violations of federal securities or antitrust laws, where econ-
omies of time, effort, and expense will be achieved by use of the class action device. Advi-
sory Committee Notes to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-103; J. M. Woodhull, Inc. v. Addresso-
graph-Multigraph Corp., 62 F.R.D. 58, 61 (S.D. Ohio 1974); Illinois v. Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 490 (N.D. Ill. 1969). Class actions certified under Rule
23(b)(3) are sometimes referred to as "damage" class actions. See Miller, Federal Class Ac-
tions, supra this note, at 12-13; Bernstein, Judicial Economy and Class Actions, 7 J. Legal
Studies 349 (1978) (This article is a statistical study of "damage" class actions in the South-
ern District of New York and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The author concludes
that class actions are at least as efficient as nonclass actions in terms of judicial time ex-
pended per dollar of recovery effected and per dollar's worth of injury recompensed).
Before a class action is certified under Rule 23(b)(3) the court must make two findings.
First, it must find that common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members. Second, it must find that a class action is "superior" to
other alternative methods of adjudication. "The superiority requirement is unique to those
class actions maintained under Rule 23(b)(3)." Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d
205, 211 (9th Cir. 1975). It has been suggested that the superiority requirement is the most
important one under Rule 23(b)(3). If the superiority requirement is met the other require-
ments of Rule 23 should be broadly construed in the early stages of the case. Green v. Wolf
Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). Rule 23(b)(3)(A-
D) lists four factors that are pertinent to the findings of predominance and superiority.
These four factors are nonexhaustive and do not preclude the court from considering other
factors relevant to a determination of predominance and superiority. Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104; Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 212
(9th Cir. 1975); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 107 (10th Cir. 1971); Clay-
ton v. Skelly Oil Co., 26 F.R.Serv.2d 317, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D.
377, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Cf. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 760 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974)(listing points of view from which superiority must be scruti-
nized); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969) (relevant question is number of members in proposed class).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(B). This factor is relevant to the issue of whether a class
action is superior to other methods of adjudication. See 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1780 at 69-70 (1972); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23.45 at
364 (2d ed. 1980). It is a prominent factor in securities fraud cases. See Note, Class Action
Treatment of Securities Fraud Suits Under the Revised Rule 23, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1150, 1163 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note, Securities Fraud Class Action].
7. Doninger v. Pac. Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1314 (9th Cir. 1977) (denial of
1981] Parallel Class Actions
where parallel suits sought to be maintained as class actions are
pending. A federal court may, for example, be faced with a parallel
certified class action, either in another federal court8 or in a state
court.9 Whatever the stage of the parallel class action, the federal
class certification held proper where a consent decree had been entered into by defendant in
a prior class action); Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co., 26 F.R.Serv.2d 317, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(class certification denied due to pendency of a parallel class action in a Delaware state
court). See text accompanying notes 26-34 infra.
One of the purposes of the class action device is to avoid multiplicity of litigation, and the
absence of other suits is often an important factor in determining that class action treat-
ment is appropriate. See, e.g., Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 714 n.6
(7th Cir. 1968) (denial of class certification in securities action error where no parallel litiga-
tion pending); American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155,
157 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (class of 1,200 exhibitors at convention certified in action for negligence
allegedly causing fire in convention center where no other suits in progress); 7A WRIGHT &
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1780 at 70 (1972); 3B MooRE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE, 23.45 at 364-65 (2d ed. 1980).
In general, where other actions have not been commenced, class action treatment is
deemed proper. See, e.g., Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968);
American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 15 (N.D. Ill. 1969);
Fidelis Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 164, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (securities class
action certified where no other actions had been commenced by members of shareholder
class); Siegal v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722, 725 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (treble damage
antitrust action certified where no indication any related litigation had been commenced);
Zeigler v. Gibralter Life Ins. Co., 43 F.R.D. 169, 173 (D.S.D. 1967) (securities class action
certified where individual claims so small that separate suits would be impracticable). Cf.
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 458 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (class
action certified where other pending cases all in same district); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D.
377, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (class action certified where actions consolidated in single district).
But cf. Berley v. Dreyfus & Co., 43 F.R.D. 397, 398-399 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (if a class of inter-
ested litigants is not already in existence the court should not go out of its way to create
one).
In contrast, where individual cases have been commenced, class action treatment may be
denied. 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1780 at 70 (1972); 3B
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23.45 at 364-65 (2d ed. 1980). Contra, Kronenberg v. Hotel
Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 45-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The filing of individual cases
indicates a willingness and desire on the part of other class members to bring and control
their own actions. Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co., 26 F.R.Serv.2d 317, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); 7A
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1780 at 70 (1972); 3B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23.45 at 364-65 (2d ed. 1980). See Note, Securities Fraud Class Action,
supra note 6, at 1163. But see Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484,
495 (N.D; Ill. 1969) (extensive litigation already commenced indicates need for class action).
8. See Doninger v. Pac. Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1977); Becker v.
Schenley Indus., Inc., 557 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1977); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971); Barkal v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 51 F.R.D. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Ro-
senfield v. Integrated Container Serv. Indus. Corp., 50 F.R.D. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Utah v.
American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
9. See Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975);
Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1975); Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co., 26
F.R.Serv.2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 427 F.
Supp. 1211 (N.D. Ill. 1977). See notes 16-34 and accompanying text infra.
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court must consider its existence when deciding whether to certify
the later suit as a class action.
This article will examine the criteria used by federal courts to
determine the propriety of granting class action status when a class
has been certified in a parallel state suit. It will evaluate these cri-
teria in light of the rules governing the relationship between fed-
eral and state courts. Relevant factors that a federal court should
consider on a motion for class certification where a state court has
already granted class action status to a parallel suit will be ex-
amined. This article will suggest that a federal court should not
defer to the determination of the state court, but rather should
certify a second class action where the claims in the federal suit
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court.
JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF PARALLEL CLASS ACTIONS
Parallel Federal Class Actions
Parallel federal class actions are examples of the type of duplica-
tive litigation that the class action device is designed to avoid. Fed-
eral courts have discretion to determine whether class action treat-
ment is appropriate, 10 and such determination will not be
disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is shown.' 1 The burden of
proof is on the party seeking class certification to show that a class
action may properly be maintained.' 2 Where a class action has pre-
viously been certified in a parallel federal suit, federal courts in
later suits have uniformly exercised their discretion by denying
class certification to the later suits.'3
10. Califano v. Yamasaki, 422 U.S. 682, 703 (1979); Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343,
1348 (4th Cir. 1976); Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 210 (9th Cir. 1975);
Clark v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 697, 700 (W.D. La. 1976).
11. Doninger v. Pac. Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1309 (9th Cir. 1977); Clark v.
Watchie, 513 F. 2d 994, 1000 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); Price v. Lucky
Stores, Inc., 501 F.2d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1974).
12. E.g., Doninger v. Pac. Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1977); Clay-
ton v. Skelly Oil Co., 26 F.R.Serv.2d 317, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1968). See generally, Comment,
Making the Class Determination in Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 791,
798-801 (1974).
13. In Barkal v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 51 F.R.D. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 140 treble damage
antitrust actions had already been commenced against the same defendants for substan-
tially the same violations of the antitrust laws. Forty-eight of the' actions had been brought
by states, and 41 of the states accepted a settlement offer, including the state in which the
named plaintiff resided. The court, deciding that the plaintiff states would provide more
adequate representation for the nonsettling class members, denied plaintiff's motion for
class certification.
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Denial of class certification is appropriate to avoid duplicative
litigation in a number of circumstances. Where the plaintiffs in the
later suit do not seek different relief or proceed on theories differ-
ent from those raised in the earlier suit, class status is typically
denied."' The denial of class status is also appropriate where the
In another antitrust suit, Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17 (C.D. Cal.
1969), the State of Utah moved to represent a class composed of "every incorporated whis-
tle-stop, hamlet, village, town, city, county, and water and sewer improvement district in
Utah, Nevada, Wyoming, and Idaho." Id. at 18. Five years before the suit was filed, treble
damage actions had been begun by other states "charging exactly the same general antitrust
conspiracies .. " Id. These cases had been certified as class actions and other states, in-
cluding Utah, were given an invitation to join as plaintiffs. All of the parties to that class
action settled, and the cases were dismissed. The court held that the five years of prior
litigation on the same facts and the same law was fatal to Utah's class action allegations,
and therefore denied certification. Id. at 20.
Another case involving the settlement of a prior federal class action is Doninger v. Pac.
Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1977). This was a sex discrimination suit by
female employees who had not accepted a settlement and consent decree in a prior federal
class action. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of class certification, reasoning that since
prior litigation is often the most critical factor in denying certification under Rule 23(b)(3),
the existence of the consent decree was grounds for denial of class certification. Id. at 1314.
A prior federal class action may also have reached verdict when a motion for class certifi-
cation is presented in a subsequent federal suit. Becker v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 557 F.2d
346 (2d Cir. 1977) was an action by minority shareholders of a corporation claiming that a
merger proxy statement was false and misleading under federal securities laws. A suit had
been previously certified as a class action in the same federal district court whose claim
"was virtually identical to the basic claim made in the present case .. " Id. at 347. Plain-
tiffs in Becker had refused an invitation to intervene in the earlier suit. After trial in the
earlier action a verdict was rendered in favor of the defendants. The Second Circuit affirmed
the denial of class action status. Since the plaintiffs could have intervened in the earlier
suit, the court held that a class action was not a superior method of adjudication. Id. at 348-
49.
In Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971), plaintiffs brought an
action in the District Court for the District of Utah, alleging violations of § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) and Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
Ninety-four actions had previously been brought against the same defendants in the South-
ern District of New York. Two of these actions had been certified as class actions and dis-
covery was well advanced. Further, as the district court's opinion shows, plaintiffs waited to
renew two previously denied motions for class certification until after a judgment had been
rendered in their favor. Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. 566, 568 (D. Utah
1970). The denial of class certification was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. 446 F.2d 90 (10th
Cir. 1971).
But see Rosenfield v. Integrated Container Serv. Indus. Corp., 50 F.R.D. 237 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), discussed at note 14 infra.
14. See cases discussed at note 13 supra. But see Rosenfield v. Integrated Container
Serv. Indus. Corp., 50 F.R.D. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). This case was an action for damages from
alleged misrepresentations in a prospectus. Plaintiffs claimed violations of the Securities Act
of 1933, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5. Defendants op-
posed class certification on the ground that a parallel suit had already been certified as a
class action in the same federal district court. The court, however, did not consider the
pendency of a parallel case to be dispositive. The plaintiffs in Rosenfield alleged representa-
Loyola University Law Journal
only benefit of certification of a second class action is attorneys'
fees for counsel in the second suit."' Finally, where the class would
gain no additional benefits if a second class action were certified
and the defendants would be forced to bear the burden of defend-
ing a second suit and risking inconsistent adjudications, class certi-
fication should be denied.
Parallel State and Federal Class Actions
The problems faced by courts where parallel state and federal
class actions exist are more complex. Where only parallel federal
class actions are involved, consolidation and transfer of actions to a
single district are alternative procedures to class certification.
These procedures are not available, however, where parallel actions
are pending in a federal and state court. In three cases, federal
courts have denied class certification in deference to a parallel
state court class action.
In Kamm v. California City Development Co., 6 investors sued
promoters of a desert land promotion scheme, alleging violations of
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5,
violations of certain California statutes, and asserted common law
claims of fraud and breach of trust. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's order dismissing the class action and struck the
class allegations from the complaint. The basis of the dismissal was
a prior state court action instituted by the California Attorney
General and Real Estate Commissioner. This suit was brought
against certain of the same defendants for deceptive trade prac-
tices arising out of the same desert land scheme. A judgment was
entered on a settlement agreement, and the state court expressly
retained continuing jurisdiction over the action. Plaintiffs in the
federal suit were individuals who had not accepted the settlement
tions not alleged in the parallel suit. "The class should have the benefit of all alleged mis-
representations." Id. at 238. The Rosenfield class also included more purchasers than did
the parallel suit. Further, the court questioned the adequacy of the representation in the
parallel suit. The court concluded that the burdens of "double discovery, double prepara-
tion, and duplicate trials" could be avoided by consolidation of the two class actions. Id. at
239.
15. See Comment, Colorado River, supra note 3, at 673. For a discussion of the incentive
the prospect of substantial attorneys' fees plays in encouraging the bringing of class actions,
see Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 761 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally, Mowrey,
Attorney Fees in Securities Class Action and Derivative Suits, 34 J. CoRP. LAw 267, 269-70
(1977).
16. 509 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1975).
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offer. They sought to represent more investors than were covered
by the settlement agreement and also sought a greater measure of
damages.17
The Ninth Circuit articulated several factors other than those
found in Rule 23(b)(3) to support the district court's denial of class
certification.18 These factors included: duplication of judicial time;
significant relief had been realized in the state court; the state
court retained continuing jurisdiction; no member of the class was
barred from instituting an individual action; the individual claims
of the federal plaintiffs were still viable; and a class action would
prove costly to the defendants.19 Although the federal suit -alleged
violations of state and federal statutes not relied upon in the state
suit, the court did not consider this significant. Instead, the Ninth
Circuit stressed that both actions involved the same fraudulent
conduct of the defendants.20
In Clark v. Watchie,'21 the Ninth Circuit was once again con-
fronted with parallel state and federal class actions. The state and
federal actions were filed on the same day by the same plaintiffs
against the same defendants. Both suits arose out of the sale to the
public of limited partnerships in a land syndicate. The state suit
alleged breach of fiduciary duty by mismanagement of partnership
affairs. The federal complaint alleged violation of section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The state suit
was the first to reach trial and resulted in a finding that defen-
dants had acted in good faith, but were still guilty of mismanage-
ment. Judgment was entered for the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the fed-
eral district court granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment, holding that the state court findings of fact collaterally
estopped the plaintiffs from litigating their federal claims. The
court also refused to allow the suit to be maintained as a class
action.12
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that res judicata would not
bar the 10b-5 claim for two reasons. The court maintained that
federal jurisdiction over the claim was exclusive, and a 10b-5 ac-
tion is a different cause of action from a claim for breach of fiduci-
17. Nothing in the settlement agreement precluded anyone who did not accept the set-
tlement offer from bringing an individual action. Id. at 208.
18. Id. at 212. See note 5 supra.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 213.
21. 513 F. 2d 994 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975).
22. Id. at 1000.
1981]
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ary duty.2 3 The district court's application of collateral estoppel
was also rejected, since both the factual settings of the two suits
and the applicable legal standards were different.2 4 Nevertheless,
the Ninth Circuit did affirm the denial of class status. In doing so,
however, the court did not discuss the appropriate standard to be
applied by a federal court where a parallel state class action is
pending. The court merely deferred to the district court's determi-
nation of the class status question, ruling that the district court
had not abused its discretion.25
The propriety of granting class certification to a federal suit
where a state court class action had previously been certified arose
for a third time in Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co. 2 6 Plaintiffs were share-
holders of Skelly Oil Co. prior to its merger with its controlling
affiliate, Getty Oil Co. Two suits involving the same transaction
and the same defendants had previously been filed, one in a fed-
eral and one in a state court. The federal suit charged violations of
federal securities laws and sought rescission of the merger, or in
the alternative, money damages.27 The state court complainants al-
leged fraud and breach of fiduciary duties and sought money dam-
ages.28 The plaintiffs in the Clayton case also alleged federal secur-
ities law violations. It had not progressed beyond the pleadings
stage when plaintiffs made a motion for class certification. Class
certification was denied on the basis of the pendency of the paral-
lel state and federal actions.'
In denying class certification, the Clayton court held that a mul-
tiplicity of class actions would compromise their function in pro-
23. Id. at 997. Exclusive jurisdiction for claims alleging violations of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 is vested in the federal courts by 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. Res judicata will only
preclude a second suit where the causes of action in the two suits are identical. See notes
47-50 infra and accompanying text.
24. Id. at 998-99. See notes 51-57 infra and accompanying text.
25. Id. at 999-1000.
26. 26 F.R.Serv.2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The court stated the issue to be "whether the
existence of an antecedent state court litigation based upon the same facts and seeking simi-
lar relief therefore, and previously designated as a class action, renders that procedural de-
vice inappropriate in the case at bar." Id. at 318.
27. This suit was entitled Evmar v. Skelly Oil Co. It was pending in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California. Extensive discovery had already taken
place in Evmar by the time plaintiffs in Clayton moved for class certification. Evmar was
brought as a class action, but class certification was denied due to the pendency of the state
court action.
28. This suit, Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., was brought in the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery. Although it was filed after Evmar, Rosenblatt was first to be certified as a class action.
29. 26 F.R.Serv.2d 317, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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moting economy of judicial time and avoiding inconsistent judg-
ments. Formation of a second class would cause repetitious
discovery and pose the danger of double recovery.30 The pendency
of related cases indicated the desire of individual members to con-
trol their own suits.31
The court found it to be immaterial that, unlike the state class
action, Clayton involved alleged violations of federal securities
laws. It reasoned that the allegations of both complaints arose
from the same activities of the defendants 3 and also noted the
possibility that certification of the federal action might interfere
with the state court proceedings. 3 The court concluded that the
two actions were virtually interchangeable, and since class action
status had already been granted in the state proceeding, a class
procedure was not warranted in the federal action.3 4
Although the courts in Kamm, Clark, and Clayton articulated
different rationales for the denial of class certification, each de-
ferred to the state court's prior grant of class action status in the
parallel action. The courts in Kamm and Clayton focused on the
virtual identity of the conduct alleged to have been engaged in by
the defendants and the similarity of relief sought in the state and
federal courts. The Ninth Circuit in both Kamm and Clark de-
ferred to the district court's denial of certification. In Kamm, the
court cited a number of factors justifying the district court's deci-
sion.35 In Clark, the court merely held that the district court had
not abused its discretion. 6
In none of these decisions, however, did the courts articulate fac-
tors that a district court should consider in determining the pro-
priety of certifying a second class action. Thus, these opinions af-
30. Id. at 321.
31. Id. But cf. Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). This was an action brought on behalf of holders of securities in the defendant corpo-
ration seeking rescission of purchases of the securities and money damages. The complaint
alleged violations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. Defen-
dants opposed class certification on the ground of three parallel state court actions involving
the same issuance of securities. The court certified the class action, stating "the fact that
other suits have been begun in the state courts and the desire to protect the interests of
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions do not
militate against permitting this action to continue as a class action." Id. at 45-46 (footnote
omitted).
32. 26 F.R.Serv.2d at 321.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 509 F.2d 205, 212 (9th Cir. 1975).
36. 513 F.2d 994, 999-1000 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975).
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ford little guidance to future courts that are faced with a similar
situation.
PERTINENT FACTORS IN DETERMINING PROPRIETY OF CERTIFYING A
SECOND CLASS ACTION
The denial of certification for a class action does not result in
the dismissal of the individual claims of the named plaintiffs.37
Nevertheless, where the claims of individual class members are
small, it is highly unlikely that the case will proceed.s Where the
claims raised in the federal court class action are within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the federal court, the absent class members
have been left without a forum in which to litigate their federal
claims. Therefore, the court's analysis must not be limited to a
consideration of the extent of litigation already commenced.
Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction
The complaints in Kamm, Clark, and Clayton all alleged viola-
tions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Act gives federal
district courts exclusive jurisdiction of actions alleging violations
thereof.3 9 Furthermore, the Act provides that the rights and reme-
dies thereunder are in addition to any others that may exist.40 This
37. Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 212 (9th Cir. 1975).
38. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43
F.R.D. 472, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711,
715 (7th Cir. 1968). See generally, Cohen, "Not Dead But Only Sleeping": The Rejection of
the Death Knell Doctrine and The Survival of Class Actions Denied Certification, 59
B.U.L. REv., 257, 259-60, 291-96 (1979).
If the case does not proceed to judgment as an individual action, however, the plaintiff
will not be able to appeal the denial of class certification. In Coopers v. Lybrand & Livesay,
437 U.S. 463 (1978), the Supreme Court held that orders denying class certification were not
appealable either as final orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or under the "collateral order doc-
trine" of Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The court rejected the
approach followed in cases such as Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967), which had held an order denying class certification
appealable because it amounted to a "death knell" for the entire case. See generally, Cohen,
supra this note; Black and Warren, New Battles in the "Class Struggle" - The Federal
Courts Re-examine the Securities Class Action, 34 Bus. LAW., 455, 466-69 (1979).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 658 (1978); Cotler v.
Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537, 540 (3d Cir. 1975); McGough v. First Arling-
ton Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 1975).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any
and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity; but no person
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter
shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total
amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of.
Parallel Class Actions
raises a serious question as to the propriety of denying class treat-
ment in deference to a parallel state court class action when the
plaintiffs in the federal suit bring claims under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.
This factor was virtually ignored by the courts in Kamm"' and
Clayton.42 By focusing only on the conduct of the defendants and
the relief sought, the courts concluded that the state and federal
actions were the same. The courts considered it unimportant that
relief was sought on different theories since both suits arose out of
the same set of operative facts."
In contrast, the court in Clark" was obliged to discuss the rela-
tion between the state and federal law claims. There, the defen-
dants contended that the state court judgment barred plaintiffs'
federal claims under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral es-
toppel. The court concluded that res judicata could not apply since
a 10b-5 claim is one over which federal courts have exclusive juris-
diction.45 Collateral estoppel did not apply because the two suits
involved different factual and legal issues." In effect, then, al-
though the state law judgment did not bar the federal claims of the
individual plaintiffs on res judicata or collateral estoppel grounds
it did act as a bar to the federal claims of the absent class mem-
bers, unless they chose to bring individual suits. Thus, the courts
in Kamm, Clark, and Clayton failed to give proper attention to the
fundamental differences between the state and federal claims in
denying class certification in the federal action.
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
The dual purpose of res judicata and collateral estoppel is to
protect litigants from the burden of relitigating identical issues
with the same party or his privies and to promote judicial economy
by preventing needless litigation.47 Res judicata bars a second suit
See Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, 414 F. Supp. 1270, 1279 (N.D. 11. 1976); Moran v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 279 F. Supp. 573, 577 (W.D. Pa. 1966), af'd, 389 F.2d 242 (3d
Cir. 1968).
41. 509 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1975).
42. 26 F.R.Serv.2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
43. See text accompanying notes 18-20, 32-34 infra.
44. 513 F.2d 994 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975).
45. Id. at 997.
46. Id. at 998-99.
47. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). See generally, Einhorn and
Gray, The Preclusive Effect of State Court Determinations in Federal Actions Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 J. CORP. LAW 235 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Einhorn
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where a judgment on the merits has been rendered in the first suit
involving the same parties or their privies and the same cause of
action."' The same set of operative facts may, however, give rise to
separate causes of action. 9 For example, violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 is a different cause of action from a common
law claim of fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, even though they
are based on the same set of operative facts.50 Therefore, res judi-
cata is not available to defendants as a defense to a claim under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 where the prior suit was based
on a state law cause of action.
In contrast, collateral estoppel is applicable where the second
case is based on a different cause of action. 51 The judgment in the
first suit acts as a bar to relitigating those issues that were actually
litigated in the first suit and necessary to its outcome.52 Collateral
estoppel will be applied in a federal court where three conditions
and Gray]; Vestal, Tactical Considerations in Securities Litigation: Recent Developments,
3 J. CORP. LAW 1, 16 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Vestal]; Jacobs, Affirmative Defenses to
Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 Actions, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 905-08 (1976); Vestal,
Res Judicata/Preclusion By Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L.
REV. 1723 (1968); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doc-
trine, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 281 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Currie]; Note, The Collateral Estop-
pel Effect of Prior State Court Findings in Cases Within Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Collateral Estoppel and Exclusive
Federal Jurisdiction]; Note, Collateral Estoppel: The Changing Role of the Rule of Mutu-
ality, 41 Mo. L. REV. 521 (1976); Note, Class Action Judgments and Mutuality of Estoppel,
43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 814 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, Mutuality of Estoppel]; Note,
The Effect of Prior Nonfederal Proceedings on Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction Over Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Effect of Prior Nonfederal Proceedings]; Note, Res Judicata: Exclusive Fed-
eral Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State-Court Determination, 52 VA. L. REV. 1360
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, Res Judicata and Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction].
48. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Cromwell v. County of Sac,
94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876).
49. Kernel Kutter' Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 284 F.2d 675, 676 (7th Cir. 1960);
Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 279 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 389
F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968).
50. Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975);
Abramson v. Penwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1969); Wellington Computer
Graphics, Inc. v. Modell, 315 F. Supp. 24, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Contra, Connelly v. Balkwill,
174 F. Supp. 49, 60 (N.D. Ohio 1959), afftd, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960). See Note, Collat-
eral Estoppel and Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 47, at 1291-92; Note, Effect of
Prior Nonfederal Proceedings, supra note 47, at 940-47; Note, Federal-State Relations
Under Rule lob-5 - Procedural Relations, 23 Sw. L. J. 526, 551 (1969).
51. E.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876). See articles cited at note 47 supra.
52. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Cromwell v. County of Sac,
94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876); Clark v. Watchie, 513 F.2d 994, 998 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 841 (1975).
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are met: first, the issue in the prior and present suit are the same;
second, the prior suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits;
and third, the party against whom the plea of collateral estoppel is
being raised was a party or in privity with a party in the prior
suit.58
Nevertheless, where the second cause of action is based upon a
claim within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court, it is un-
clear to what extent collateral estoppel will preclude issues within
the federal claim." Initially, it was held that the grant of exclusive
jurisdiction implied a total immunity from any prejudgment in a
state court.5" Later cases, however, have not uniformly held to this
position. In cases brought under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, for example, some courts have given collateral estoppel effect
to state court findings of fact on state causes of action paralleling
the federal claims." Such cases should not be taken, however, to
indicate that the older rule is no longer viable. Whether state court
findings should have collateral estoppel effect on a claim over
which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction is recognized by a
53. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313
(1971). This was a suit for patent infringement wherein the Court held that a patentee was
estopped to assert the validity of a patent that had been declared invalid in a prior federal
suit against a different defendant, unless the patentee could show that he did not have full
and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of the patent in the prior suit. The Court over-
ruled Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1935), which held that a party in a second action
could raise the defense of estoppel only if both parties to the second action were bound by
the judgment in the first case. Rejecting the mutuality of estoppel doctrine exemplified by
Triplett v. Lowell, the court adopted the three part test announced by Justice Traynor in
Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942):
In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three questions are perti-
nent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the merits?
Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party
to the prior adjudication?
402 U.S. at 323-24, quoting 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. See generally, Currie, supra
note 47; Note, Mutuality of Estoppel, supra note 47, at 817-20.
54. See generally, Einhorn and Gray, supra note 47; Vestal, supra note 47, at 1749-50;
Block, Current Critical Points in Stockholder Litigation, 62 Nw. L. REV. 181, 197-201
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Block]; Note, Collateral Estoppel and Exclusive Federal Juris-
diction, supra note 47; Note, Effect of Prior Nonfederal Proceedings, supra note 47; Note,
Res Judicata and Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 47, at 1363-86.
55. See Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
825 (1955). See also Note, Collateral Estoppel and Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, supra
note 47, at 1283-85; Note, Effect of Prior Nonfederal Proceedings, supra note 47, at 955;
Note, Res Judicata and Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 47, at 1364-69.
56. See, e.g., Green v. Ancora-Citronelle Corp., 577 F.2d 1380, 1383 (9th Cir. 1978); In re
Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 427 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. Il1. 1977).
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number of courts to be a very difficult question. 7 The issue must
be faced, however, when a federal court is confronted with the
question of whether to certify a class action where a parallel state
class action is pending.
Stay of a Federal Action in Deference to a Parallel State
Action
The general rule when parallel in personam actions are pending
in state and federal courts is that each court may proceed without
reference to the proceedings in the other court.58 A judgment in
one court will be given res judicata effect in the other.5" The mere
potential for conflicting adjudication does not warrant staying the
federal action.60 Courts have, however, exercised their discretion-
57. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 674 (1978) (Brennan, J. dissenting),
on remand sub. nom., Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228,
1236 n.18 (7th Cir. 1979); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 831-33 (9th Cir. 1963);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Cove Vitamin & Pharmaceutical, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 72, 74
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
A good deal of discussion has focused on the purpose of the grant of exclusive jurisdiction
to federal courts over claims of violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In Will v.
Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978), Justice Brennan argued in his dissent that the
grant of exclusive jurisdiction indicates "a legislative desire for the uniform determination
of such claims by tribunals expert in the administration of federal laws and sensitive to the
national concerns underlying them." Id. at 670. He further argued that Congress may have
assumed "that the claim would be litigated only in the context of federal-court procedure-a
fair assumption when the claim is within exclusive federal jurisdiction. For example, Con-
gress may have thought the liberal federal discovery procedures crucial to the proper deter-
mination of the factual disputes underlying the federal claims." Id. at 675. But cf. Calvert
Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1235-36 n.16 (7th Cir. 1979)
("There was no legislative discussion of sec. 27 prior to its enactment."); In re Transocean
Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 427 F. Supp. 1211, 1221 (N.D. Ill. 1977) ("[Tlhere is nothing in
the legislative history of the 1934 Act which indicates a purpose for vesting exclusive juris-
diction in a federal court.)" See generally, Einhorn and Gray, supra, note 47, at 241; Vestal,
supra note 47, at 4; Block, supra note 54, at 198, 201; Note, Collateral Estoppel and Exclu-
sive Federal Jurisdiction, supra note 47, at 1281-82; Note, Effect of Prior Nonfederal Pro-
ceedings, supra note 47, at 936-69.
58. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922); In re Glenn W. Turner Enter-
prises Litigation, 521 F. 2d 775, 780 (3d Cir. 1975); Jennings v. Boenning & Co., 482 F.2d
1128, 1132 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1025 (1973); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil
Co., 478 F.2d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1973); Graziano v. Pennell, 371 F.2d 761, 764 (2d Cir. 1967).
The contrasting rule for in rem actions is that the court whose jurisdiction first attaches
retains jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976); Jennings v. Boenning & Co., 482 F.2d 1128,
1132 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1025 (1973); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co.,
478 F.2d 674, 677 (5th Cir. 1973); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 833 (9th Cir.
1963).
59. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 682 (5th Cir. 1973).
60. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976).
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ary power to stay the federal action until termination of the paral-
lel state suit where the jurisdiction of the state and federal courts
over the subject matter of the action is concurrent."1 This limited
power to stay the federal suit offers a compromise in the conflict
between the obligation of the federal courts to exercise their juris-
diction and the needs of efficient judicial administration. 2
Factors that courts have considered relevant in deciding whether
to stay the federal action include: crowded dockets; 53 the chrono-
logical order in which the actions were filed;6 whether the federal
suit was interposed for the purpose of vexatious delay; 5 whether
the state action will be dispositive of controlling issues in the fed-
eral action;66 and whether the entire controversy can be resolved in
the state forum."
If the remedy sought in the federal proceeding is one over which
the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction, federal courts have
generally declined to stay proceedings pending resolution of the
earlier state action.68 Many cases have emphasized the obligation
61. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 663 (1978); Cotler v. Inter-County
Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537, 541 (3d Cir. 1975). See generally Note, Power to Stay
Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE L. J.
978, 980-81 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Note, Power to Stay].
62. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1236 (7th Cir.
1979).
63. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 665 (1978); Aetna State Bank v. Al-
theimer, 430 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1970); Schiff v. Metzner, 331 F.2d 963, 965 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 881 (1964). See also PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d
674, 680 (5th Cir. 1973); Klein v. Walston & Co., 432 F.2d 936, 937 (2d Cir. 1970); Mottolese
v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1949).
Aetna was overruled in Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd,
437 U.S. 655 (1978). For the current status of Aetna as law in the Seventh Circuit, see
Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1231 (7th Cir. 1979).
64. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 683 (5th Cir. 1973); Aetna
State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 1970); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d
301, 303 (2d Cir. 1949).
65. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979).
66. See Klein v. Walston & Co., 432 F.2d 936, 937 (2d Cir. 1970); Mottolese v. Kaufman,
176 F.2d 301, 302 (2d Cir. 1949); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Cove Vitamin & Pharmaceutical,
Inc., 211 F. Supp. 72, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
67. See McGough v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 1975);
Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 542 F.2d
662 (2d Cir. 1971).
68. See Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1975);
Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 1963); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Cove Vitamin & Pharmaceutical, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 72, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See generally
Cherner, Considering the State Court as a Forum for Securities Actions, 9 CUMBERLAND L.
REV. 663, 680-83 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Cherner]; Comment, Colorado River, supra
note 3, at 657. But see Klein v. Walston & Co., 432 F.2d 936, 937 (2d Cir. 1970); Aetna State
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of federal courts to take jurisdiction of cases properly before
them. 9 More than crowded dockets are necessary to justify a fed-
eral court's stay of an action over which it has exclusive jurisdic-
tion.70 Nor is the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation a valid basis
for issuing a stay, since only a federal court can decide a matter
over which it has exclusive jurisdiction. 1 For this same reason, a
stay of the federal action cannot be justified on the ground that
state court findings of fact might act as an estoppel in the federal
action. 72 The effect of a stay in such a case is to relegate the plain-
tiff to a state court fact finding and then to return to federal court
to litigate both the federal legal issues and the application of fed-
eral law to facts found in the state court.3
The opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Colorado
Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970).
69. E.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817
(1976); Lecor, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 502 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1974); Mach-
Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1963); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo,
Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971). See Com-
ment, Colorado River, supra note 3, at 646-47.
70. Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 1963).
71. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S.
655 (1978); Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1975).
72. Lecor, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 502 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1974). See Mach-
Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 833 (9th Cir. 1963):
It would seem to us unthinkable that a federal court having exclusive jurisdiction
of a treble damage antitrust suit would tie its own hands by a stay of this kind in
order to permit a judge of a state court, without a jury, to make a determination
which would rob the federal court of full power to determine all of the fact issues
before it.
An even more consequential effect of a stay is that it could, as a practical matter, operate
as a dismissal, since a judgment in the state court will be pleaded as res judicata in the
federal suit. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 682 (5th Cir. 1973); see
Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 302 (2d Cir. 1949). But see Will v. Calvert Fire Ins.
Co., 437 U.S. 655, 664-65 (1978) (stay not equivalent to dismissal since suit not dismissed
and party can urge reconsideration of stay order); Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut.
Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1235 (7th Cir. 1979) (stay not equivalent to dismissal where stay
issued after state court had already decided issue that would be pleaded as estoppel in fed-
eral suit).
In the class action context, it is likely that a denial of class certification will have the same
practical effect as a dismissal. The ability to urge reconsideration of the denial of class sta-
tus may be more theoretic than real. It is unlikely that, in a class action involving small
claimants, the named plaintiffs will continue to litigate their individual claims in the hope
that at some later date they may be able to persuade the court to reconsider its determina-
tion of the class action question. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974);
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
73. Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537, 542 (3d Cir. 1975). Cf. Mc-
Gough v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1975).
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River Water Conservation District v. United States74 is helpful in
considering the appropriateness of a stay.76 In that opinion, the
Court discussed the traditional factors justifying abstention7 and
enumerated certain "exceptional circumstances" in which dismissal
of the federal suit is appropriate. 7 These factors include: assump-
tion of jurisdiction over a res by the state; avoidance of piecemeal
litigation; inconvenience of the federal forum; and the order of ini-
tiation of the actions.78 Of course, no single factor is determinative.
A court should weigh the obligation to exercise jurisdiction against
the combination of factors counselling against that exercise. 7 ' A
careful study of these considerations is also appropriate when a
federal court must decide whether to deny class certification in
deference to a parallel state court class action.
Adequacy of Representation in the State Class Action
One of the prerequisites to the maintenance of a class action is
that "the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class." 0 Whatever collateral estoppel effect a
judgment in a state court class action will have upon a parallel fed-
eral court class action will depend, to a large degree, on whether
the state court plaintiffs adequately represented the interests of
the class.6 1 Where the possibility of parallel federal and state court
actions exists, the federal court, in deciding the certification issue,
must not only ask whether the federal plaintiffs will fairly and ade-
quately represent the class, but whether the state court plaintiffs
are fairly and adequately representing the class.
The adequacy question is crucial in determining whether the ab-
74. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
75. See Comment, Colorado River, supra note 3, at 662.
76. 424 U.S. at 813-16.
77. Id. at 818.
78. Id. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1234 (7th
Cir. 1979); Bio-Analytical Serv., Inc. v. Edgewater Hosp., Inc., 565 F.2d 450, 454 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978).
79. 424 U.S. at 818-19.
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Adequacy of representation is a question of fact to be de-
cided on the circumstances of each case. Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, 329 F.2d
909, 914 (9th Cir. 1964); Clark v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 697, 701 (W.D. La.
1976); Zeigler v. Gibralter Life Ins. Co., 43 F.R.D. 169, 174 (D.S.D. 1967).
81. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-43 (1940); Roman v. ESB, Inc., 550 F.2d 1343,
1356 (4th Cir. 1976); Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1973); Clark v. South
Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 697, 701 (W.D. La. 1976); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D.
472, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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sent class members' due process rights are violated.8 2 A class action
is an exception to the general rule that a person is not bound by a
suit to which he is not a party.83 Members of the class who are not
present may be bound by the judgment where they were in fact
adequately represented.8 Where there is a lack of adequate repre-
sentation, however, due process is violated if absent parties are
bound by the judgment.88
The adequacy requirement must be applied not only at the time
of the initial determination as to whether a class action may be
maintained, but throughout the proceedings.8 6 For purposes of res
judicata, the primary criterion is whether the class representative,
through qualified counsel, vigorously and tenaciously protects the
interests of the absent class members.87 If it becomes apparent at
any stage, even after trial, that the representation is not adequate,
class status must be withdrawn.88 Piecemeal litigation will not be
avoided by denying class certification in the federal action if a
judgment in the state court class action can be collaterally at-
tacked on grounds of inadequate representation.
ANALYSIS
The pertinent factors analyzed in the foregoing sections are not
discrete and unrelated. Rather, they can be combined into a model
for analyzing the propriety of certifying a federal class action in
which claims within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court
are raised, when a parallel class action has previously been certi-
fied in a state court.
82. Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 73 (5th Cir. 1973). See Frankel, Some Preliminary
Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 46 [hereinafter cited as Frankel].
83. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555,
568 (2d Cir. 1968); Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350, 1353 (E.D. La. 1970). It is only in a
subsequent action, however, that the res judicata effect of the judgment can be tested. Gon-
zales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1973); Frankel, supra note 82, at 45; Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106; 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23.60 at
469-70 (2d ed. 1980). But see Walsh v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 452 F. Supp. 80, 82 (E.D. Pa.
1978).
84. See cases cited at note 81 supra.
85. See cases cited at note 81 supra.
86. Guerine v. J & W Inv., Inc., 544 F.2d 863, 864 (5th Cir. 1977). See Gonzales v. Cas-
sidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973).
87. Id. at 75; Clark v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 697, 702 (W.D. La. 1976);
Rivera v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 17 F.R.Serv.2d 473, 475 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
88. Guerine v. J & W Inv., Inc., 544 F.2d 863, 864 (5th Cir. 1977); Gonzales v. Cassidy,
474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973) (failure to prosecute appeal rendered representation inade-
quate). See Zeigler v. Gibralter Life Ins. Co., 43 F.R.D. 169, 174 (D.S.D. 1967).
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The first question the court should ask is whether the federal
claims will be precluded by a determination in the state court ac-
tion. Examination of the relevant authorities has shown that no
definite answer can be given to this question. Nevertheless, consid-
erable weight should be given to this factor before a decision to
grant or deny certification is made.
Defendants will typically counter federal class certification by
claiming that an action properly belongs in the state court because
the plaintiffs have no viable federal claims. It would be improper
for the federal court to conduct a preliminary hearing on the mer-
its of the federal claims.89 A better approach would be for the de-
fendant to bear the burden of proving that the federal claims are
nonexistent, frivolous, or interposed solely for purposes of delay.
This could be done by means of a motion to dismiss,90 motion for
judgment on the pleadings, ' or a motion for summary judgment.92
The avoidance of piecemeal litigation is certainly a concern and
will seemingly be accomplished by denial of class certification in
the federal suit. Since the federal action is the only one in which
the class may raise its federal claims, however, piecemeal litigation
can only be avoided if the state court action is stayed, abandoned,
or enjoined, none of which are likely to occur. In this situation,
piecemeal litigation may be avoided by denying class certification
in the federal court action, but only at the expense of denying the
plaintiff class relief under the federal statutes.95 It is submitted
89. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). "We find nothing in either
the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary
inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a
class action." Id.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
93. Piecemeal litigation will not be avoided if the judgment in a state class action can be
collaterally attacked on the grounds of denial of due process. This could result from either
failure to give proper notice or inadequate representation. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1974); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-43 (1940).
The state class action, for example, may be certified under rules similar to FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1) or (2) which do not require mandatory notice to individual class members or permit
class members to opt out. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974); Gon-
zales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1973). If the suit is one which a federal court
would only certify under Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that absent class members receive
notice and be given an opportunity to exclude themselves, any judgment may be subject to
collateral attack. When a federal court is faced with a parallel state class action in which
there is a very real possibility that a judgment in the state action may be subject to collat-
eral attack, denial of class certification in deference to the state action would appear to be
improper. See Comment, Colorado River, supra note 3, at 673-74.
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that this is too high a price to pay.
The next factor to assess are those considerations surrounding
the res judicata and collateral estoppel effect of a state court judg-
ment. There is certainly a difference between giving a state court
judgment collateral estoppel effect in a federal class action and de-
ferring proceeding with the federal class action to allow the state
court class action to reach judgment first. In the first instance, the
state court judgment is already an accomplished fact when the fed-
eral court is confronted with the issue of class certification. In the
second instance, the federal court has created the res judicata/col-
lateral estoppel problem for itself by not proceeding with the fed-
eral class action.9 It is also important to keep in mind that the
state court judgment may be reversed on appeal." Since a determi-
nation of whether a suit may proceed as a class action is condi-
tional and may be amended," and the claims of the named plain-
In addition, multiplicity may not be avoided if the state court class encompasses only
residents of that state, or if the state court certifies a nationwide class and the judgment is
collaterally attacked by nonresident class members claiming the state court had no jurisdic-
tion over them. Commentators disagree as to whether the state court has in personam juris-
diction over the nonresident plaintiffs. See Forde, Class Actions in Illinois: Toward a More
Attractive Forum For This Essential Remedy, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 211, 227 (1977); Note,
Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification, 92 HARv. L. REV. 718
(1979); Note, Finding a Forum For the Class Action: Issues of Federalism Posed by Recent
Limitations on Use of Federal Courts, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1009, 1045-48 (1977); Note,
Consumer Class Actions With a Multistate Class: A Problem of Jurisdiction, 25 HASTINGS
L. J. 1411, 1423-38 (1974).
94. Cf. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979).
Upon remand from the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit determined that the district
court should re-evaluate its decision to stay in light of Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Upon reconsideration, the lower court ruled the
stay to be proper. Calvert had admitted in oral argument before the Supreme Court that it
had no claim for damages under Rule 10b-5, since it had paid no money into the reinsurance
pool. Therefore, it had no claim under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court, since
the state court had jurisdiction to grant rescission. 600 F.2d at 1232.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court had discretion to stay a fed-
eral suit interposed for the purpose of delaying a state court proceeding. Id. The court noted
that no res judicata problem had been created by the stay, since the state court had already
ruled that the reinsurance pool did not constitute a security before the stay order was en-
tered. Id. at 1235.
95. An interesting example of res judicata problems involving parallel state and federal
class actions is presented by In re Transocean Tender Offer Sec. Litigation, 455 F. Supp.
999 (N.D. Ill. 1978). This case does raise a question as to whether the application of res
judicata and collateral estoppel actually result in judicial economy.
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1): "An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and
may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits." See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406
F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 461 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Seigel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,
271 F. Supp. 722, 725 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
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tiffs remain even if a class is not certified, 97 denial of class
certification in deference to the state court class action is the func-
tional equivalent of a stay of the federal class action.
If the court concludes that the representation in the state court
class action is possibly inadequate, then the argument that the
state court suit will have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect
on the federal court class action loses its validity. It would appear,
then, that the better procedure is to certify the federal action as a
class action and to face the difficult question of the res judicata
effect of the state court action when and if it is properly raised
after a judgment on the merits in the state court action.'8
Thirdly, the court should consider whether the representation in
the state class action is adequate. This is a difficult task, as the
attorneys and parties in the state action are not before the federal
court. Perhaps this problem can best be solved by means of a pre-
sumption that representation in the state court class action is ade-
quate. Since the party seeking class certification has the burden of
showing that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been met,99 it
would not be unfair to require this party to bear the burden of
proving that representation in the state suit is inadequate. In the
absence of proof of inadequacy, the court can presume that repre-
sentation in the state court is adequte.
This presumption, however, may not be appropriate where the
federal class action seeks relief on claims under the exclusive juris-
diction of the federal court. In Clark v. Watchie,0 0 Kamm v. Cali-
fornia City Development Co.,101 and Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co.,' 0 2
the federal plaintiffs all raised claims that could not have been
raised in the state court class action, together with pendent com-
mon law claims that were raised by the plaintiffs in the state court.
This would immediately lead one to question the adequacy of the
representation in the state court class action. Why did the plain-
tiffs bring the action in a state court when the class has additional
Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
97. Kamm v. California City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 205, 212 (9th Cir. 1975).
98. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c), res judicata is an affirmative defense that must be
pleaded. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
99. Doninger v. Pac. Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1977); Clayton v.
Skelly Oil Co., 26 F.R.Serv.2d 317, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
100. 513 F.2d 994 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975).
101. 509 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1975).
102. 26 F.R.Serv.2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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claims for relief under federal statutes that could only be sued
upon in a federal court, thereby limiting the relief available to the
class?103 Further, the class may bear a more difficult burden of
proof on their state law claims than they do on the federal claims.
Inadequacy of representation, and perhaps even collusion, would
be suspect if the defendant who is opposing class certification in
the federal action did not oppose certification in the state court
action.
Other, minor factors should also be considered. The inconve-
nience of the federal forum in unlikely to be a practical problem. A
particular federal forum may be inconvenient, but this inconve-
nience can be remedied by means of a motion to transfer.' 4 The
order of initiation of the two suits is a factor that has a practical
appeal, for it can be mechanically applied. This factor should not,
however, be given undue weight. The result could be a race to the
courthouse0 5 and possibly collusive suits.106 A more important
consideration is the stage to which the state action has proceeded.
If the state action is near trial or a decision on appeal is imminent,
denial of class certification, or perhaps a postponement of the de-
termination of the certification issue, would not work undue hard-
ship on any party.10 7
CONCLUSION
Federal courts have generally denied class certification to a fed-
eral suit when a parallel state court action has previously been cer-
tified as a class action. The reason most often advanced is the
avoidance of duplicative litigation. Where, however, the federal ac-
tion is one over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction,
103. Plaintiffs in all three cases sought relief under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
One commentator has suggested that the only possible advantage to bringing a securities
action in a state court is if the state action could be prosecuted more speedily than a federal
action. Cherner, supra note 68, at 682. With respect to the importance of class actions as a
means of enforcing federal securities laws, see 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1819 (2d ed.
1961) ("The ultimate effectiveness of the federal remedies, when the defendants are not
prone to settle, may depend in large measure on the applicability of the class action de-
vice."). Accord, Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 295 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
977 (1969); Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See
also Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 482, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
105. See Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 495 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
106. See Note, Power to Stay, supra note 61, at 985; Comment, Colorado River, supra
note 3, at 673.
107. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 107 (10th Cir. 1971); 3B
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23.45 at 365 (2d ed. 1980).
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the desire to avoid duplicative litigation is not a sufficient reason
for denying class certification. Neither is it appropriate to deny
class certification because of the possible res judicata/collateral es-
toppel effect the judgment in the state suit may have on the fed-
eral action. It is far from clear what preclusive effect a state court
judgment or state court findings of fact may have on a claim over
which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. The same policy
considerations that caution against the application of res judicata/
collateral estoppel to bar the federal claim, and that also caution
against a stay of the federal suit in deference to a parallel state
proceeding, likewise caution against denial of class certification in
the federal action.
KEVIN T. KEATING

